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THE LEGACY OF LOUIS HENKIN: HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE "AGE OF TERROR"
An Interview with Sarah H. Cleveland*
Louis Henkin and the Human Rights Idea
What effect has Professor Henkin's work had upon your own
thoughts or scholarship in the human rights field?
My scholarly work spans the fields of international human
rights and U.S. foreign relations law. I am particularly interested in
the process by which human rights norms are implemented into
domestic legal systems, the role the United States plays in promoting
the internalization of human rights norms by other states, and the
mechanisms by which the values of the international human rights
regime are incorporated into the United States domestic legal
system.
To say that Professor Henkin's work has contributed to my
own thinking on these issues would be an understatement. In
addition to his phenomenal work in constitutional law and
international law, Professor Henkin did the pathbreaking work in
developing two distinct fields of law relevant to the "war on terror":
the field of U.S. foreign relations and the field of international
human rights. It was Professor Henkin, first and foremost, who
resurrected foreign relations law as a field of study. Professor
Henkin's scholarship pushed back forcefully against the Roman
observation that in war-and, perhaps, in foreign relations
generally-the law is silent. The law, he said in his brilliant book,
Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution,' speaks clearly and
. Professor Cleveland is the Louis Henkin Professor of Human and
Constitutional Rights and Co-Director of the Human Rights Institute at
Columbia Law School.
1. Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution (2d
ed. 1996).
500 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [38:499
distinctly in this area, and is equally enforceable. Henkin's foreign
relations work reminds us that numerous legal constraints operate in
this area-constraints from international law; constraints from
constitutional separation of powers and individual rights; and
constraints from sub-constitutional framework statutes.
I first read Professor Henkin's famous article, Is There a
'Political Question' Doctrine?,2 when I was in law school representing
Haitian refugees who were being interdicted by the United States
and detained on Guantdnamo in the early 1990s. The government's
argument then (as now) was that U.S. treatment of aliens on
Guantdnamo or on the high seas was an unreviewable political
question dedicated to the executive. Its legality therefore could not be
tested in any court. Henkin's article argued that the concept of
"political questions" was being used improperly to avoid adjudication
by the courts, and that other, narrower doctrines adequately
addressed circumstances where discretion had been dedicated to
another branch of government. This view has been very influential
on my own work examining the historical origins of the concept of
plenary sovereign power over foreign affairs and the extent to which
international law helps define and limit the U.S. foreign affairs
powers.
In his human rights work, Professor Henkin has had a
strongly normative focus. His writings emphasize the importance of
considering human dignity in all aspects of law. He also has given us
the wonderful image of the United States as the "flying buttress" of
the international human rights system-a nation standing outside of
the cathedral of human rights, but which supports that structure.3
My own work has focused in part on exploring that image of the U.S.
relationship to the international community. I have examined the
ways in which the United States fulfills this "flying buttress" role by
using economic sanctions laws and domestic human rights litigation
to promote compliance with human rights abroad. But I also have
worked to counter this image by exploring the mechanisms by which
the United States itself internalizes the broader values of the
2. Louis Henkin, Is There a 'Political Question' Doctrine?, 85 Yale L.J. 597
(1976).
3. Louis Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 405,
421; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Foreword: On American Exceptionalism, 55
Stan. L. Rev. 1479, 1484-85 (2003) (commenting on Professor Henkin's first use
of this metaphor).
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international human rights community. I have written extensively
on the relationship between international law and U.S. domestic law,
looking in particular at the historical and ongoing conversation in
this country between international law and the U.S. Constitution.
As international law principles inform U.S. domestic law, the United
States becomes, itself, a part of the human rights cathedral.
One interesting aspect of Professor Henkin's work is that
originally he did not seem to view his work in foreign relations law
and human rights law as connected. He treated them largely as
distinct fields. His book on Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution
4
does not appear to be conceived of as a human rights text. But the
period since 9/11 has underscored how deeply intertwined human
rights and foreign relations law are. Guantdnamo, ghost detention
centers, the Military Commissions Act, and many other aspects of the
"war on terror" are extremely problematic from the perspectives of
both constitutional and human rights law. It is precisely the failure
to recognize the operation of law in this field-the operation of
international, constitutional, and statutory law-that has led directly
to human rights violations. I think in his later work Professor
Henkin came to recognize that foreign relations law is an important
component of the human rights story. One of Professor Henkin's
lasting contributions has been his insight that written
constitutionalism, separation of powers, and basic principles of rule
of law are integral guardians of human rights.
How do you think that Professor Henkin's work has been
influential in the human rights field and how has it shaped the
ideas and direction of the recent human rights movement?
Professor Henkin has been unequalled both as a scholar and
as an advocate in influencing international human rights. As a
scholar, he founded the field of human rights in law and other
disciplines. Many of his mantras are now central themes of the
human rights movement. His ideas regarding the evolution of "the
human rights idea," his conviction that states are authorized to
pursue international remedies against other states for violations of
mutually obligatory human rights treaties or customary
international human rights law, and his criticism of sovereignty as a
barrier to rights enforcement-his famous declaration "away with
4. Louis Henkin, supra note 1.
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the 's' word"5-have deeply penetrated human rights scholarship and
advocacy. Professor Henkin's Human Rights casebook 6 and his
famous volume The Age of Rights,7 among many other writings, have
helped the human rights idea penetrate law schools, court decisions,
and the work of scholars and activists around the globe.
Professor Henkin also embodies the model life of the scholar-
practitioner. In 1978 Professor Henkin helped found the Columbia
University Center for the Study of Human Rights, because he
believed at that early date that human rights training should not
just be for lawyers. He wanted to reach out to many different
disciplines-philosophy, political science, social work-because every
field that touches on human beings implicates human rights. A
decade ago he founded the Human Rights Institute at the Law
School, to help train human rights scholars, teachers, and advocates
around the globe. The Institute seeks to build bridges between
theory and practice; between law and other disciplines; and between
domestic constitutional rights and international human rights.
Henkin's extensive work in the State Department and later as a
State Department advisor, his work on the board of the U.S. non-
profit Human Rights First, his work helping to train judges in
international law, his role as the President of the American Society of
International Law and as the U.S. Representative on the U.N.
Human Rights Committee, and his efforts in submitting significant
amicus briefs to the U.S. Supreme Court as recently as in the
Hamdan case 8-all of these commitments have contributed
importantly to the internalization of the human rights idea into the
American psyche and around the world.
While Professor Henkin believes deeply in the international
human rights system, the actor in that system that he has been most
concerned with is the United States. He has recognized the central
role that the United States played in developing the idea of rights,
beginning with the Declaration of Independence and early state
constitutions. He has also emphasized the critical role that the
5. See Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty and Globalization, and
Human Rights, et cetera, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1 (1999); Louis Henkin, The
Mythology of Sovereignty, Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Newsl. reprinted in Proceedings in
the Canadian Council of International Law 15 (1992).
6. Human Rights (Louis Henkin, Gerald L. Neuman, Diane F. Orentlicher
& David W. Leebron eds., 1999).
7. Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights (1990).
8. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
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United States played in creating the substance and architecture of
the modern international human rights system following World War
II. In his writings, teaching, and practice, he has struggled in the last
half century to ensure that we in the United States live up to the
promise of the ideals that we created for ourselves and that we have
helped convey to so many others.
It has been about 20 years since Professor Henkin helped to
compile the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States. In what areas relating to your work has it had the
greatest influence? Are there parts of the Restatement that you
feel should be updated or revised to reflect current law?
The Restatement was a massive undertaking at the time,
grappling with all aspects of U.S. foreign relations law and broad
swathes of international law, from the law of the sea to
extraterritorial jurisdiction. 9 Such a work cannot be all things to all
people, regardless of the integrity and expertise with which it is
drafted. Aspects of the Restatement were controversial when it was
written, such as Section 403, which sets forth a reasonableness
standard for the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.' ° The failure
of Section 712 of the Restatement to recognize the United States'
requirement of "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation as
the international rule for foreign expropriations of property would be
another example." The Reagan Administration State Department
objected to a number of aspects of the Restatement, which I view as a
9. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rel. Law of the U.S. (1987).
10. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rel. Law of the U.S. § 403(1) (1987)
(stating that "a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect
to a person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise of
such jurisdiction is unreasonable").
11. That section states that:
The United States Government has consistently taken the position in
diplomatic exchanges and in international fora that under international
law compensation must be "prompt, adequate and effective," and those
terms have been included in United States legislation . . . That
formulation has met strong resistance from developing states and has
not made its way into multilateral agreements or declarations or been
universally utilized by international tribunals, but it has been
incorporated into a substantial number of bilateral agreements
negotiated by the United States as well as by other capital-exporting
states both among themselves and with developing states.
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rel. Law of the U.S. § 712, cmt. c (1987).
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sign of the author's healthy independence from political influence.
The fact that a provision was or is controversial, however, does not
mean it is incorrect.
For human rights litigation in U.S. courts under the Alien
Tort Statute (ATS),12 the Restatement has been extremely
influential, particularly with respect to its discussion of the human
rights principles that enjoy the status of customary international
law. Section 702 of the Restatement sets forth what the drafters
viewed as a non-exhaustive list of the human rights principles that
had acquired the status of customary international law at that time:
genocide; slavery or the slave trade; summary execution;
disappearance; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment; prolonged arbitrary detention; and systematic racial
discrimination. 13  This list, together with the Restatement's
recognition of the principle of universal jurisdiction and the
possibility of civil liability for violations of universal customary
norms in Section 404,14 has been phenomenally influential in helping
U.S. courts determine which principles of international human rights
law are sufficiently "specific, universal, and obligatory" 5 to be
enforceable in U.S. courts. 16 Suits under the ATS, in turn, have
contributed significantly to the refinement of these concepts
internationally and have informed the development of international
human rights law in many other fora. Both human rights law and
international criminal law have evolved significantly since the
Restatement was drafted, and the Section 702 list of customary
international law principles could now be refined and updated to
reflect these developments. Such an update reasonably would
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (stating that "[tihe district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.").
13. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rel. Law of the U.S. § 702, cmt. a
(1987) ("This section includes as customary law only those human rights whose
status as customary law is generally accepted (as of 1987) and whose scope and
content are generally agreed.").
14. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rel. Law of the U.S. § 404, cmt. b
(1987) (stating that "international law does not preclude the application of non-
criminal law on [the] basis [of universal interests], for example, by providing a
remedy in tort or restitution for victims of piracy").
15. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (citing In re Estate
of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)).
16. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rel. Law of the U.S. § 702
(1987), cited with approval in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 737.
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explicitly include forced labor, war crimes and crimes against
humanity, imposition of the death penalty on juveniles and the
mentally disabled, and recognition of state-sponsored rape as torture,
among other things. This is just one sliver of the ways in which the
Restatement has been influential.
One issue that was not controversial at the time, but which
has become so, is the status of customary international law as federal
law in the United States. Since the Restatement was written, a
revisionist controversy has arisen over the discussion in Section 111
of the relationship between customary international law and U.S.
law.'7 The traditional view, expressed in the Restatement, was that
customary international law was part of the general common law,
enforceable in the federal courts, and that it remained part of the
federal common law after the decision in Erie v. Tompkins.'1 This
traditional understanding had lengthy support in American legal
history, and it was not controverted by the Executive Branch when
the Restatement was published. The revisionist challenge, however,
contends that customary international law is not federal law, but
only general law, and thus lost its status as enforceable federal law
as a result of the decision in Erie. The Restatement view largely was
ratified by the Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, where the Court agreed that international law remains
part of the federal common law.' 9 But the Court also acknowledged
some of the concerns of the revisionists and appeared to back away
from the broadest implication of the Restatement's approach: the
claim that customary international law was directly enforceable in
U.S. courts through Section 1331 federal question jurisdiction,
without any other intervening action by Congress or the President to
17. Compare Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rel. Law of the U.S. §
111, cmt. d (1987) ("Customary international law is considered to be like common
law in the United States, but it is federal law."), with Curtis A. Bradley and Jack
L. Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights
Litigation, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 319 (1997) (arguing that federal courts should not
have the power to incorporate rules of customary international law without
explicit authorization by statute or treaty). For criticisms of the revisionist
position, see, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?,
111 Harv. L. Rev. 1824 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About
Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith,
66 Fordham L. Rev. 371 (1997).
18. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
19. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 732.
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create jurisdiction.20 The discussion is brief and is dicta, so it is not
clear what to make of the Court's language. But the best reading of
Sosa is probably that customary international law is federal law for
purposes of Article III jurisdiction, but that the general federal
question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331,21 may not create
jurisdiction for the federal courts to hear cases arising directly from
customary international law. The Alien Tort Statute, however, does
create such jurisdiction over claims by aliens alleging core violations
of international human rights law, as the Supreme Court recognized.
So the direct enforceability of customary international law under
statutory federal question jurisdiction is one area where current
doctrine may have come into tension with the Restatement.
I think the overarching contribution of the Restatement to
the current "war on terror," though, is Professor Henkin's central
insight that "[i]nternational law is law like other law... It is part of
the law of the United States, [to be] respected by Presidents and
Congresses, and by the States, and given effect by the courts."22 Any
student of American legal history knows that this assertion is deeply
grounded in historical U.S. law and practice. But in the period since
9/11 we have seen direct attacks on each of these principles: that
international law is like other law, that it is part of our law, that it is
binding on all branches of our government, and that it is enforceable
in the courts. Fortunately, in response to this attack, we have seen
some reaffirmation of these same principles. The importance of the
U.S. commitment to the prohibition on torture has been reasserted.
In Hamdan, the Supreme Court read the existing statutory
authorization for military commissions as incorporating limits
imposed by Common Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention.2 3 In
Hamdi, the plurality suggested that the due process rights of a
citizen detained as an enemy combatant should comply, at a
minimum, with the procedural requirements for detention of
prisoners of war set forth in the Geneva Conventions.24 Reaffirming
this central insight of the Restatement about the role of international
law would go a long way toward reestablishing the rule of law in the
20. Id. at 731 n.19; Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rel. Law of the U.S.
§ 111, cmt. e (1987).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
22. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rel. Law of the U.S., pt. I, ch. 1
(1987) (introductory note).
23. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
24. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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"war on terror."
Are there any anecdotes from co-teaching last year with Professor
Henkin that really stood out in your mind? What aspects of his
approach to teaching human rights have influenced you most?
David Leebron, the former Dean of Columbia Law School, has
said that being in the classroom with Lou Henkin is like being in the
room with James Madison. And it is true. You are in the presence of
a founding father. Students are in awe of Lou and love being in the
classroom with the person who both witnessed the birth of the
modern human rights movement and who has been a pillar of that
regime for the last fifty years.
There are at least two themes from Lou's approach to the
class that have profoundly influenced my own teaching of the subject.
The first is his emphasis on a rigorous exploration of the idea of
rights: Where do rights come from? How have they evolved? What
do they mean in different cultures and societies in the modem era?
Many law school courses address fundamental rights, but few classes
challenge students to consider where such rights came from or ask
how they are justified in the modern legal era. Professor Henkin
starts out his course by asking students "What is a right?" They have
a remarkably hard time answering that question.
Professor Henkin ultimately defines rights as "claims that a
government is obligated to respect." You will notice two things about
this definition. It does not address the genesis of the claims. And it is
focused on governments. According to this definition, rights run
primarily between governments and individuals-which raises many
interesting questions down the road regarding the legal obligations of
private individuals, corporations, international organizations, and
other non-state actors.
Professor Henkin then examines the origins of the idea of
rights, which he explicitly traces to the Anglo-American and
European Enlightenment traditions. Students read the Magna
Carta,25 the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the
Citizen,2 6 and philosophical perspectives on rights over the past three
centuries, until they reach the post-World War II era-Professor
Henkin's modern "age of rights." From the 1948 Universal
25. Magna Carta (1215).
26. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (George A.
Bermann et al. trans., 1998) (1789).
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Declaration of Human Rights27 forward, rights are defined as
inherent in human dignity. They also acquire a teleological
justification: to advance freedom, justice, and world peace. To some
extent, I think this introduction can be hard on students. They come
into the course to study wrenching contemporary problems such as
torture and genocide, and they are immediately confronted with the
Magna Carta, Locke, and Kant. But, in the end, I think the course is
much richer as a result of this approach. It forces students to grapple
with the nature and genesis of rights, and gives a philosophical
grounding to the rest of the course. I don't believe that any other
casebook takes a similarly thick approach to the idea of rights.
The second influential theme from Professor Henkin's
approach is his idea of the holistic nature of rights. Professor
Henkin's casebook and course are entitled "Human Rights," not
"International Human Rights." Professor Henkin does not use
language casually, and this particular choice is very intentional. Lou
does not distinguish between national and international protection of
rights. He views the nation state and domestic law as the critical
protector of rights in the international legal order. Rights were
protected in the law of nation states, particularly in the
constitutional orders of the United States, long before they were
defined and protected by the international legal order. Professor
Henkin's casebook thus contains a very fluid examination of the
elaboration and protection of rights through many legal regimes-
international treaty bodies, regional tribunals, national and sub-
national legal systems-which he views as engaged in a constant
dialogue and common enterprise to protect rights. Most people do not
think of the U.S. Bill of Rights and other national constitutions as
human rights documents, but Louis Henkin does.
As a matter of style, the most lasting impression that I will
have in the classroom is of Professor Henkin asking the large,
sometimes unanswerable, questions: "What is constitutionalism?"
"Do we need world government?" "Should law regulate morality?" He
possesses an uncanny ability to combine a rich knowledge of history
and legal developments with an approach that forces students to
place the subject in a broad theoretical and geopolitical context.
I guess the last thing I would say about teaching with Lou is
27. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 72, art. 1,
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
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that he has a phenomenally refreshing optimism. The study of
human rights can be so frustrating because so much is violated, and
so little is legally enforceable in the narrow way that lawyers often
want to think about enforcement. But Lou has tremendous faith in
the infectious power of the human rights idea, and he revels in what
has been accomplished. He fully recognizes the practical limitations
on implementing the human rights idea. We have U.N. "treaty
bodies" that receive human rights reports from states rather than an
international human rights court where states can be sued, because
states would not agree to submit to a court. He accepts that fact, and
he focuses on what the human rights system can accomplish, not on
what it has not or cannot. Professor Henkin has always seen the part
of the human rights glass that is full. Students respond to his
optimism and it invigorates their interest in the subject.
Human Rights and the "War on Terror"
What role do you think international human rights law can play
in changing the prosecution of the global "war on terror"? Is
criminal law or the law of armed conflict a more effective avenue
for protecting human rights in this context?
I believe that some acts of terrorism can fall within the
paradigm of the law of armed conflict, also known as the law of war.
The 9/11 attacks reasonably fell within the definition of an armed
attack, and the military response in Afghanistan met with great
international sympathy. But the armed conflict paradigm also has
been applied sweepingly to aspects of the fight against terrorism that
are more properly addressed through the criminal justice system.
That said, the core problem we are currently confronting, it
seems to me, is not whether terrorism can be addressed under the
laws of war, but that the U.S. executive branch has not been willing
to accept that it is limited by any law in its anti-terrorism response.
In other words, in its detention policies and elsewhere, the
Administration has wanted to invoke powers recognized by the laws
of war-the power to act in self-defense, even preemptively; the
power to detain combatants-but it has not wanted to be bound by
the limits that accompany those powers.
We got into the mess on Guantdnamo not because the
government refused to apply the criminal law paradigm to the
Guantdnamo detainees, but because it did not want to apply any
legal paradigm at all: no habeas jurisdiction, no constitutional rights,
2007] 509
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no international human rights law, no international humanitarian
law. The government wants a complete legal black hole. The same is
true for the military commissions. The President's initial order
establishing the military commissions purported to prohibit any
domestic or foreign court from reviewing any aspect of the
commissions.2 8 And the Military Commissions Act of 2006 largely
accomplished this. 9
If the government had, from the beginning, provided the
Guantdnamo detainees with the very minimal process to determine
their status that is required by Article 5 of the Geneva Conventions,
and provided ordinary court martial type proceedings to combatants
charged with war crimes, it could have avoided withering
international criticism as well as multiple trips to the Supreme Court
challenging the validity of the Guantnamo detentions and the jury-
rigged and highly problematic Combatant Status Review Tribunal
and military commission procedures that are now in place there.
We are currently confronting very real and challenging
questions regarding the relationship between international human
rights law and humanitarian law in various forms of international
and non-international armed conflict. I believe that the best
interpretation is that both bodies of law apply, but that one may
serve as a lex specialis that informs the interpretation of the other.
There are also real difficulties with applying the existing law of
armed conflict to a "war" with no territorial or temporal scope. But
right now it would be a significant improvement if we would concede
that some law applied to U.S. actions on Guantdnamo and elsewhere
that has credibility with the international community.
Given that a central constitutional issue in the "war on terror,"
namely the suspension of habeas corpus for "unlawful enemy
combatants" in the Military Commissions Act, is now pending
before the Supreme Court, can international human rights law
play a role in habeas law? If so, how?
28. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, Nov. 13, 2001, § 7 (b)(2) (prohibiting any individual subject to
trial by military commission from seeking "any remedy or maintain[ing] any
proceeding, directly or indirectly,... in (i) any court of the United States, or any
State thereof, (ii) any court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international
tribunal").
29. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2601
(2006) [hereinafter MCA] (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28 & 42 U.S.C.).
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International human rights law can certainly play a role in
habeas law. The substantive content of constitutional habeas corpus3"
is somewhat uncertain, but the Supreme Court repeatedly has said
that habeas means at least what it meant when the Constitution was
adopted.3' We also know that habeas traditionally was understood to
be an evolving standard.32 Widely embraced international human
rights conceptions of basic fair procedural protections therefore can
inform the procedural protections that must be afforded on habeas.
International human rights law is also relevant to the
question of whether the constitutional right to habeas corpus reaches
Guantdnamo. Around 1900, in a series of cases called the Insular
Cases, the Supreme Court held that only "fundamental"
constitutional rights applied to all sovereign U.S. territories.33
Recently the Supreme Court held that Guantdnamo is effectively a
U.S. territory. 4 So one critical question that remains for determining
whether constitutional habeas applies on Guantdnamo is whether
habeas corpus is a "fundamental" right. Obviously, you would think
that a venerable right like habeas is, but the Supreme Court, in the
Insular Cases, held that the right to jury trial was not.35 So how do
you show that habeas corpus is fundamental? You can show that it
historically has been fundamental to the Anglo-American legal
system. You can show that it was fundamental in the British Empire
and is now fundamental to eveiy country in the Commonwealth. And
you can look to international human rights law to show that habeas
is no longer limited to being an Anglo-American right. The principle
30. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9 ("The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it.").
31. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518
U.S. 651, 663-64 (1996)) (stating that "at the absolute minimum, the Suspension
Clause protects the writ 'as it existed in 1789'").
32. Discussion of William Hurst, The Role of History, in SUPREME COURT
AND SUPREME LAW 59, 61 (Edmond Cahn ed., 1954) (statement of Paul A.
Freund) (observing that institutions such as habeas corpus involve an
evolutionary or "dynamic element which itself was adopted by the framers").
33. See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 292-95 (1901) (White, J.,
concurring) (contending that only fundamental rights applied in unincorporated
U.S. territories); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (constitutional right
to jury trial is not fundamental and does not apply to unincorporated
Philippines).
34. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
35. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
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that detained persons have a right to speedily challenge their
detention in court is now recognized much more widely, and is
incorporated into many human rights instruments, including the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,36 the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms," and the American Convention on Human Rights.38 All of
this makes it particularly embarrassing that the United States is
broadly denying this right. So international human rights law
definitely has a role to play in defining the substantive content and
geographic scope of constitutional habeas in the Guantdnamo cases
before the Supreme Court.
Non-state actors have begun to play an increasingly large role in
international political and humanitarian crises, yet international
human rights instruments focus on nation-states as the relevant
unit for accession. What types of strategies might human rights
advocates employ to engage such non-state actors?
The rise of non-state actors-whether rebel or paramilitary
groups, corporations, private individuals, international
organizations, NGOs, or other entities in civil society-has posed a
fundamental challenge to the traditional conceptualization of the the
human rights system. As originally conceived, the state was the
entity primarily responsible for respecting, protecting, and ensuring
human rights. But we now recognize that non-state actors can
contribute significantly both to the violation of human rights and to
their prevention. International law has tried to respond in various
ways. International criminal law has penetrated to the level of the
individual and the corporation, extending principles of accountability
directly to non-state actors. Treaty bodies have become more
receptive to receiving information from non-state actors. Market-
oriented strategies such as disseminating information to consumers,
and labeling and boycott campaigns can be effective in influencing
the behavior of certain actors, particularly name-brand corporations.
36. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9(4), opened
for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 1966 U.S.T. 521, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976).
37. [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 5(4), opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
38. American Convention on Human Rights art. 7(6), opened for signature
Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143 (entered into force July 18, 1978).
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To the extent that non-state actors operate within the
boundaries of a state that can exercise effective control, states can be
encouraged to fulfill their own traditional obligations to control such
actors within their borders. One interesting effect of the creation of
the International Criminal Court (ICC)39 has been to put pressure on
states that are parties to the Rome Statute to implement domestic
mechanisms to enforce international criminal law and to bring their
own domestic prosecutions. This has the potential to expand the
impact of the ICC well beyond its own prosecutions.
Corporations are one of the many complex forms of non-state
actors. Many multinational corporations have wealth, power, global
reach, and influence vastly exceeding that of many states. Indeed,
some corporations engage in state-like control of significant portions
of territory, like Shell in the Niger Delta. And yet, the international
human rights obligations of corporations are not well defined.
Professor Henkin's solution to this problem was to observe that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to all entities in
society, including corporations, and even including cyberspace. This
is true. But binding international human rights obligations that are
legally enforceable have not caught up with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.4" Corporations, at a minimum, are
subject to the liability recognized by international law for
individuals. But many corporations have vastly more power than
individuals, and if responsibility for corporate actors under
international law ended there, we would be looking at a vast
accountability gap.
What are the most troubling aspects of the Military Commissions
Act of 2006? Is this law likely to stand up in a democratically-
controlled Congress?
We've already discussed the provisions of the MCA that
purport to deny habeas corpus jurisdiction over any alien whom the
President designates as an unlawful enemy combatant. But the MCA
has many other problematic aspects. It purports to give the executive
branch complete discretion to determine who is an unlawful enemy
combatant.4' The MCA also allows the admission of evidence
39. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 1, opened for
signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
40. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
41. MCA, supra note 29, at §3(a)(1), subch. 1, §§ 948a(1)(ii) & 948d(c).
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obtained through coercion falling short of torture but which
nevertheless is utterly unlawful under international humanitarian
and human rights law. 2 It allows convictions based on secret
evidence. 3 [CITE]
The MCA erodes U.S. enforcement of international
humanitarian law. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
prohibits degrading treatment," and U.S. military personnel can be
prosecuted under the UCMJ for violating this. But the MCA
eliminates criminal penalties for violations of Common Article 3 that
constitute "degrading treatment or punishment."" In other words, we
apparently created a carve-out for the CIA and other non-military
personnel who engage in abusive actions that fall short of torture or
cruel or inhuman treatment, in the very narrow way that the statute
defines those terms. This is a significant backstep from the War
Crimes Act of 1996,46 which had been adopted to implement U.S.
obligations under the Geneva Conventions. All of these provisions
encourage further hair-splitting about the legal definition of torture
and other forms of abuse. For basic global rule of law, it is also very
unfortunate. Logically, the conclusion drawn abroad will be that
these provisions were designed to tolerate abusive interrogation
practices. And if the United States can do it, why can't everyone else?
Finally, in Hamdan the Supreme Court concluded that the
President's military commissions would violate Common Article 3 by
not observing basic principles of procedural fairness viewed as
indispensable by the civilized world. In a direct rejection of the
Hamdan decision, the MCA states that the military commissions
authorized by the statute comport with the obligations of Common
Article 3. The statute then turns around and purports to prohibit the
courts from considering international law in interpreting it,48 despite
the fact that supporters of the law claimed to preserve intact the
United States' obligations under the Geneva Conventions. This
reflects a very troubling attitude both toward the separation of
powers and toward the United States' core international legal
42. MCA, supra note 29, at §3(a)(1), subch. 1, § 948r(d).
43. Id. at subch. 4, § 949d(f).
44. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art.
3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
45. MCA, supra note 29, at § 6(c).
46. War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2005).
47. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 at 6.
48. See MCA, supra note 29, at § 6(a)(2).
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obligations.
Are these provisions likely to be changed by a democratically-
controlled Congress? Senator Dodd has proposed legislation is that
would eliminate most of these problems, but to date Congress has
made no significant move toward adopting it.4 9
Does U.S. immigration and asylum policy comport with
international human rights law? How might U.S. policy be
reformed to pursue a human rights agenda without damaging
more strategic U.S. interests?
This is a huge agenda, and I will just touch on a few discrete
aspects of the problem. Professor Henkin was the U.S. negotiator of
the 1951 Refugee Convention, and there are various problems with
the United States' implementation of that treaty. A personal peeve of
mine is the Supreme Court's interpretation in Sale v. Haitian
Centers Council that the Refugee Convention does not apply to U.S.
actions on the high seas.50 Apparently a multilateral treaty doesn't
limit the U.S. in international waters for reasons of comity. But
comity with whom? The net effect is that the U.S. can forcibly return
bona fide asylum seekers to a land where they would suffer
persecution. We also have an ongoing policy of differential treatment
of Haitian and Cuban refugees-automatically granting permission
to remain to Cubans who reach U.S. shores, and presumptively
returning Haitians. The policy can be explained by our historical
relationship with Cuba, but it smacks of discrimination.
Our current federal guest worker programs deny workers the
right to change employers, which makes workers captive to their
employers and violates basic international protections for migrant
workers. Our constitutional rules regarding the government's power
to expel or deny entry to aliens are based on late-nineteenth-century
views of arbitrary governmental power that are inconsistent with
contemporary international human rights and refugee law. Our
system of employer sanctions creates plausible deniability for
employers who hire undocumented aliens and places the full brunt of
criminal enforcement on the aliens. Our asylum policy only very
imperfectly implements our obligation not to return asylum seekers
to a country where they will be tortured. The list of human rights
49. Restoring the Constitution Act of 2007, S.576, 110th Cong. (introduced
by Sen. Dodd, Senior Member, S. Comm. on Foreign Rel., February 13, 2007).
50. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
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problems with our immigration and asylum policies could go on and
on. Most of these are simply poor domestic policy choices that are
unrelated to national security concerns.
Despite being a nation of immigrants, immigration law is not
an area where the United States has a particularly admirable
constitutional or human rights history. Immigration law is often
made in times of domestic stress and fear, in response to pressure to
keep immigrants out. But it is important to stress that a human
rights agenda is in the national security interest of the United
States. When the United States exercises international leadership in
respect for human rights, it encourages other countries to do the
same and thereby promotes both global human dignity and global
security. On the other hand, flagrant human rights abuse by the
United States only provides fodder for those who would threaten us.
On a more personal note, in this area we must always
remember that Louis Henkin arrived at Ellis Island at age five with
his widowed father and his siblings, as a Soviet immigrant from what
is now Belarus. He was nearly excluded from the United States
because he would not speak to the immigration officer. And yet think
of the many gifts he has brought us. In devising a humane and
effective immigration policy, we need to make sure that we do not
exclude the Louis Henkins of the world, regardless of their class,
their skin color, or their land of origin.
